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TOWARDS REDEFINING SOCRATIC IRONY 
L Warren (Stellenbosch University) 
The nature and function of Socratic irony has been much disputed in 
contemporary scholarship, and there is no source which offers a 
satisfactory account of Socratic irony. In this article I firstly argue 
that Socrates’ disavowals of knowledge cannot be taken literally.  
I then argue that Socrates also has some physical habits, in particular 
an attitude of superiority and the appropriation of Spartan dress, 
which can be interpreted as ironic within their historical context, in 
other words that Socrates’ physical actions also suggest irony.  
In conclusion I argue that Socratic irony has interlinked political and 
pedagogic functions, and I offer suggestions for the redefinition of 
the concept of Socratic irony which allows for these insights. 
Socrates has left behind a legacy that has continued to fascinate scholars to the 
present day. A large part of this fascination is because of the enigma surrounding 
this literary-historical character1, and which finds its embodiment in the Socratic 
Problem, the Socratic Method and Socratic irony. The latter has experienced a 
revival in the work of Gregory Vlastos, whose book Socrates: Ironist and moral 
philosopher (1991) raised several questions on the nature and function of Socratic 
irony. Vlastos himself tried to redefine Socratic irony as a complex phenomenon  
in which Socrates both does and does not mean what he says. This ‘complex irony’ 
(Vlastos 1991:43) varies slightly from simple irony, but is not sufficient to explain 
all the instances of irony ascribed to Socrates, and as such is simply not complex 
enough. Other attempts to redefine Socratic irony and account for this  
complexity have also fallen short (Vasiliou 1999; Vasiliou 2002; Wolfsdorf 2007) 
and has been met with criticism, most notably by Melissa Lane (2006; 2011). 
Furthermore, an overview of several dictionaries and encyclopaedias leaves us no 
more enlightened on the matter. Der neue Pauly, The Oxford encyclopaedia of 
ancient Greece and Rome and the Oxford Classical Dictionary do not contain 
entries for Socratic irony, and the entry in The Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy (Socratic irony is ‘a form of indirect communication’ used by Socrates 
‘to praise insincerely the abilities of his interlocutors while revealing their 
ignorance’; Prior 1999:861) takes an oversimplified view of the concept, which  
is rather surprising considering the amount of philosophical scholarship done on 
                                                     
1
  The question of the historicity of Socrates is still a much-disputed problem, and as such 
I prefer in this case to treat Socrates as a literary character based to an unknown extent 
on an historical person. This treatment then deals with Socrates as he is popularly 
perceived to be. For elaboration on this point see also note 6. 
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the topic since the 18th century.2 Furthermore, the Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Rhetorik gives a fairly extensive overview of the scholarship on Socratic irony, 
focusing especially on ancient sources, but takes no positive steps towards defining 
Socratic irony, opting instead to take an objective stance. In view of this oversight, 
this paper will attempt to make suggestions for the reconsideration and redefinition 
of Socratic irony to allow for its complexities. To the discussion of Socratic irony 
it will add one aspect of irony that is often overlooked: figural irony.3 
Socrates as ironist in the ancient world 
The identification of Socrates as an ironist is almost as old as Socrates himself, and 
the notion of figural irony4 is by no means a new one, but one which has received 
regrettably little attention in scholarship over the past couple of centuries. Figural 
irony first appears as a coherent concept in the work of Quintilian, who identified 
two types of irony: irony as a trope and irony as a figure. As a trope, irony is meant 
to ridicule. It is the simpler of the two types, in which the meaning and the words 
                                                     
2
  Consider for example the work of Schlegel (Albert 1993), Hegel (Nehamas 1998;  
Most 2007), Kierkegaard 1841; Watts 2010, Nietzsche (Kaufmann 1948; Conway 
1988), Bakhtin (Zappen 1996), Lefebvre (Gardiner 2012), and Derrida 1995 on Socratic 
irony. 
3
  The simple conception of irony as a verbal phenomenon, as saying something other  
than is meant, was modelled on the definition of Quintilian (contrarium ei quod dicitur 
intelligendum est; Inst. 9.2.44), who in turn modelled his definition on the work of 
Cicero (De Or. 2.269-270). This view of irony pervaded until the late 18th century.  
At this time the work of philosophers like Friedrich Schlegel made great strides  
in identifying the many complexities of irony (Nehamas 1998:65; Albert 1993:830-834; 
Barth 2007:1144-1145). Two additions to the theory of irony are particularly relevant to  
this article. The first is the notion that irony carries with it an inherent attitude of 
superiority and detachment (Colebrook 2004:18-19). The second is that irony is not  
only a verbal phenomenon, but can also be physical, a way of life (Wolfsdorf  
2007:176). This form of irony was identified by Thirlwall in the late 19th century 
(Hutchens 1960:356) and is a purposeful act of pretence which presents an incongruity 
between the attitude or appearance of the ironist and his true (dis)position. Vlastos, 
Vasiliou and Wolfsdorf do not take this physical aspect into account. Edmunds, 
however, does take note of it, but does not elaborate on its function (2004). 
4
  See note 3 for a further discussion of what is meant by ‘figural irony’. The most notable 
difference between figural and verbal irony is that figural irony takes place over an 
extended period of time and as such becomes a way of life rather than just a singular 
verbal utterance from the ironist. In this respect Rorty also discusses irony as a method 
of criticising final vocabularies (a final vocabulary is the vocabulary which is available 
to a person or a culture in order to justify their actions, beliefs and lives). Final 
vocabularies are an extension of the ironist’s person, and can only be criticised by other 
vocabularies, thus making irony of this sort necessarily extended and a way of life 
(1989:73-80; see also p.12 and note 15). 
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used to convey the meaning are incompatible. In this case the meaning (that which 
is unsaid) is often revealed by the context in which the words were uttered  
(Inst. 8.6.54-55; trans. Russell 2001). As a figure, irony is an extended version of 
the trope. It is not meant to be understood as easily as the trope, and the meaning is 
more covert, yet still the opposite of what is said (or what is presented) is to be 
understood (Inst. 9.2.45). Quintilian connected the entire life of Socrates especially 
with irony as a figure (Inst. 9.2.46). 
Even before Quintilian, Aristotle referred to Socrates’ ironic behaviour  
and struggled to reconcile it with the mean between the two extremes of ἀλαζώνεία 
(boasting) and εἰρωνεία (self-deprecation). Aristotle identified Socrates as an 
εἴρων, but argued that self-deprecation is closer to the mean (truthfulness)  
than boasting (NE 4.7; trans. Ross 2009). Aristotle mentions that Socrates was a 
habitual self-deprecator, and he says that those who dress like Spartans, which 
includes wearing a single threadbare cloak and being barefoot, which is here,  
like elsewhere, explicitly connected with Socrates, are ostentatious in their 
understatement (NE 4.7). Cicero (who coined the Latin ironia)5 also connected 
Socrates with irony (De Or. 2.269-271; trans. Sutton 1959). According to Cicero 
irony is humorous and witty, but it can also be austere (De Or. 2.271-274). 
Connecting Socrates with irony is therefore not a great leap for the modern 
reader, but there are several problems that arise when attempting to formulate not 
only a coherent, but also a comprehensive conception of Socratic irony. 
Historical background and the politics of Socrates 
Socratic irony can by no means be separated from the historical context in which it 
developed. Trying to understand the motives of Socrates without trying to 
understand what sparked them will leave the reader with an insufficient idea of the 
meaning of Socratic irony.  Furthermore, without this historical contextualisation6  
                                                     
5
  De Or. 2.269-270; trans. Sutton 1959. It is from this Latin term that we derived our term 
‘irony’. Cicero originally coined it as a translation for εἰρωνεία, based on the work of 
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (Vlastos 1991:23). 
6
  A note on the sources might be helpful here. The Socratic problem has not yet been 
solved, and in all probability it will never be solved — we simply do not have enough 
information. To highlight the complexity of this problem I offer the following: 
according to one school the historical Socrates is the Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues. 
Unfortunately dating the dialogues is nearly impossible due to insufficient evidence and 
as such the lists of early dialogues differ. Consider the accounts of Rogers 1933:53-54, 
Vlastos 1985:1n1, Rowe 2007:54 and Wolfsdorf 2007:186n11. Thus even within this 
school there is a lack of consensus regarding the sources for the historical Socrates. This 
makes the choice of sources a particularly difficult one, as the inclusion or omission of 
one or the other may elicit stark criticism. It is my opinion, however, that limiting the 
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it might not be immediately clear why some of the habits and characteristics of 
Socrates that are described in this paper were ironic. It only becomes apparent 
when we take into account the historical circumstances in which they functioned, 
of which I will here briefly remind the reader. 
Firstly, Socrates’ lifetime was not a time of peace. The Greeks were fighting 
the Persians for large parts of the 5th century (Prior 2006:29; Pomeroy et al 2008: 
220) and had formed the Delian League under Athenian leadership (Hornblower 
2002:11-15). Athens partially funded its political change from oligarchy to 
democracy with money acquired from the Delian League and eventually moved the 
League’s treasury from Delos to Athens, a controversial move. During its rule as a 
democratic empire Athens also supported several oligarchic city-states, presumably 
to keep them weak, and this was seen by some as hypocritical. Furthermore, the 
new democracy was not very popular with the aristocrats of Athens, and towards 
the end of the century there were two political coups that replaced the Athenian 
democracy first with the Four Hundred oligarchs and then with the violent rule  
of the Thirty Tyrants (Ostwald 1986:466-499). The Five Thousand, the pseudo-
democratic government that ruled in the interval, made many controversial 
decisions of their own (Hornblower 2002:174-180). 
Secondly, from the little we do know about the historical Socrates we  
can reasonably argue that he was born into an aristocratic family, which gave him 
the opportunity to serve as a hoplite in the Peloponnesian War (Wood & Wood 
1978:83). It is thus very possible that his appearance of poverty, as discussed 
below, was self-inflicted. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to take into account what we know about 
Socrates’ own views on politics. It has been argued that Socrates was pro-oligarchy 
and that his trial was in fact political, motivated by his association with some 
members of the Thirty Tyrants (most notably Critias).7 T H Irwin however rejects 
these claims on the basis that much of the textual evidence cited may represent the 
popular opinion 50 years after the trial of Socrates, but does not necessarily 
                                                                                                                          
study of Socratic irony to those sources considered to refer to the historical Socrates 
would be detrimental to our full understanding of Socratic irony as it is perceived today, 
especially in the more popular context. In this article I therefore follow the example of 
Edmunds 2004 in considering as primary sources the works not only of Plato, but also of 
Xenophon, Aristophanes, Ameipsias and Callias (of which fragments survive in 
Diogenes Laertius), as well as those of Aristotle, because there is no contradiction in the 
evidence applicable here. Where two or more sources agree on a particular trait of 
Socrates, that trait is thus assumed to be generally characteristic of Socrates as literary-
historical character. Nevertheless, the dialogues of Plato are taken as the basis of the 
study, and other sources are taken as corroboration. 
7
  See for example Vlastos 1983 and Stone 1989. On Socrates’ association with Critias, see 
Xenophon, Mem. 1.2.18, 3.14. 
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represent a reliable account of the true motives of Socrates’ accusers (1989:186). 
He then goes on to make a convincing argument that Socrates was critical of 
Athenian democracy (cf. Prot. 319b-d, Apol. 31d-32a), but not against it (Irwin 
1989:196). Among these criticisms count Socrates’ refusal to sentence the 
Arginusae generals to death, because it was illegal (Apol. 32b; trans. Fowler 1960) 
and his reference to oligarchic cities such as Sparta as well-governed (Crito 52e; 
trans. Fowler 1960), while refusing to leave Athens even for a day — an indication 
that he nonetheless preferred its laws (Irwin 1989:196; Vlastos 1983:502). With the 
inclusion of late Socratic dialogues such as the Republic and the Gorgias, Irwin 
concedes that it may appear that Socrates was anti-democratic (1989:198), but 
argues that it need not mean that he was pro-oligarchy. Instead, he argues that 
Socrates was intensely critical of the Athenian democracy, but did not suggest that 
there was a better practical alternative (1989:199). 
The historical context in which Socratic irony was developed and in which 
it functioned and Socrates’ views on politics are particularly relevant to the figural 
irony discussed below. Figural irony is however not the only component of 
Socratic irony, and in order to formulate a comprehensive definition of the concept, 
instances of verbal irony must also be discussed. 
Verbal irony 
For the verbal component of Socratic irony we turn to instances of verbal irony 
found in the dialogues of Plato. At Republic 332c-d (trans. Shorey 1943) there are 
indications that Socrates has taken a didactic approach to his conversation with 
Polemarchus, who is young and confident of his knowledge of justice. Socrates 
exclaims in exasperation when Polemarchus fails to understand what is expected of 
him, and when he gives the answer that Socrates is after, Socrates replies with 
‘good’ in the same way a teacher would reply to a student who has given the 
correct answer. Socrates thus seems to have assumed the role of the teacher in this 
situation, and thus must see himself as having some knowledge or insight which 
Polemarchus does not. When Thrasymachus grows weary of Socrates’ constant 
questioning and interrupts the conversation to accuse Socrates of being deceitful, 
Socrates uses irony to draw him into the conversation by telling him that he  
is wise, and then immediately (though indirectly) telling him exactly why he is  
not wise (Rep. 337b). Thrasymachus believes that Socrates has some form of 
knowledge, but does not see that Socrates is deliberately keeping this from 
Polemarchus in order to bring him to a realisation of his own. When Thrasymachus 
thus accuses Socrates of lying, his words are also unintentionally ironic, because 
Socrates is not lying, he is teaching through elenchus. 
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This is not the only instance in which irony and deceit are closely linked. 
Two cases that are quite similar appear in Euthyphro and Gorgias. In the former, 
Euthyphro tells Socrates that he must go, to which Socrates replies: 
 
You go away and leave me cast down from the high hope I had 
that I should learn from you what is holy, and what is not …  
 (Euth. 15e; trans. Fowler 1960) 
At 15b-c, however, Socrates said: 
 
… your words do not remain fixed but walk about, and you will 
accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk, when 
you are yourself much more skilful than Daedalus and make them 
go round in a circle? Or do you not see that our definition has 
come round to the point from which it started? 
Socrates is thus accusing Euthyphro of changing his opinion too easily. He accuses 
Callicles of the same in Gorgias 481d (trans. Lamb 1946). He says that he and 
Callicles are the same, because they both love two things. Socrates loves 
Alcibiades and philosophy, Callicles loves the Athenian demos and Demos, the son 
of Pyrilampes. According to Socrates the difference between him and Callicles is 
that Socrates is a slave to philosophy, whose views ‘always holds the same’ (482a), 
whereas Callicles will always agree with his two loves, which implies that he 
easily changes his opinion to match that of (the) Demos. It seems that Socrates is 
saying that Callicles will agree with anyone, and thus that he will always be in 
danger of contradicting himself. When Socrates thus says that he is lucky to 
converse with Callicles, because if they agree on a matter it must surely be the 
truth (482b), he cannot mean this seriously; they may agree one minute and 
disagree on the exact same matter the next. It is therefore not unreasonable to say 
that Socrates is being ironic when he says that he could learn from either 
Euthyphro or Callicles. 
Our last example of irony deals with Socrates’ knowledge disavowal,8 one 
of his most famous characteristics, and comes from Plato’s Apology: the story of 
the Delphic oracle declaring that Socrates is the wisest man (21a; trans. Fowler 
1960). Socrates claims that he wished to know what the Oracle had meant by this 
and started questioning those who are reputed to be wise. He found that they only 
seemed wise, but that in truth they were not wise at all (21b-c). He concluded  
that he was in fact wiser than all of them, because he knew that he was not wise 
(21d-22e). We cannot believe him, however, when he says that he has no 
                                                     
8
  I will here only give one example of Socrates’ knowledge disavowal, which is dealt with 
extensively in the work of Vlastos 1985, Matthews 2006, Lane 2011 and Wolfsdorf 
2004, amongst others. 
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knowledge. In the first place, saying that he knows nothing is already a well-
known paradox, because if he doesn’t know anything, how could he possibly know 
that he does not know? This is not the only instance in which Socrates in a sense 
affirms his (however incomplete) knowledge. In Apology 29b he says: 
 
But I do know [my emphasis] that it is evil and disgraceful to do 
wrong and to disobey him who is better than I, whether he be god 
or man. 
There are other cases where Socrates asserts some form of knowledge as well, such 
as the case in Republic 330d, in which Cephalus tells Socrates that he is right, and 
Socrates replies ‘I assuredly am’. Socrates’ claim that he does not know thus 
means something other than its literal meaning, though it does not necessarily 
mean the opposite. His disavowals of knowledge can thus be taken to be ironic. 
However, verbal irony is not the only aspect of Socratic irony, there is a 
physical aspect as well. As has already been mentioned, this physical aspect was 
noticed as early as the 1st century AD in the work of Quintilian, who was at the 
time expanding on the work of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 4.7) and Cicero  
(De Oratore). According to Quintilian Socratic irony was a way of life rather than 
a rhetorical device, and its aim was to remain concealed. As a long-term irony it 
sought to lay bare some sort of contradiction or incongruity and it often poked fun 
at serious matters (such as the pretended wisdom of others) in order to draw 
attention to them (Inst. 9.2.51-53). 
Figural irony 
Socratic figural irony finds its expression in two distinctive characteristics, both 
well attested to in our sources. The first is the attitude of superiority,9 the second is 
Socrates’ Spartan dress, and the two are often mentioned in close connection. 
These two characteristics of Socrates were well known in Athens, and we find the 
earliest reference to it in Aristophanes’ Clouds: 
 
… you [Socrates], because you strut like a popinjay through the 
streets and cast your eyes sideways and, unshod, endure many 
woes and wear a haughty expression for our sake [my emphasis]  
 (Clouds 362-363; trans. Henderson 1998). 
The verb βρενθύει here initially presents some difficulties. The etymology of the 
word is uncertain, but it has been convincingly argued that it comes from βρένθος, 
                                                     
9
  An attitude of superiority has more recently been recognised as being a trait that is often 
associated with the ironist (Colebrook 2004:18-19).  
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the water bird, known for walking with its chest out (Edmunds 2004:195).10 
βρένθος also means ‘proud’, and the LSJ defines βρενθύοµαι as ‘to bear oneself 
haughtily, hold one's head high’ or ‘swagger’. These words clearly carry a 
connotation of superiority which is supported by the act of casting the eyes 
sideways (τὠφθαλµὼ παραβάλλεις) and wearing a haughty expression 
(σεµνοπροσωπεῖς). Moreover, Aristophanes says that Socrates does these things 
for the sake of others, but the words ‘for our sake’ could easily be missed if the 
audience is not paying enough attention or if the words are not emphasised.  
Did he perhaps see something through Socrates’ ironic attitude which led him to 
believe that Socrates had good reasons to act as he did? I believe so.11 
We see further elaboration on what it means to ‘endure many woes’ in lines 
412-417, which describe the lengths someone has to go to in order to prove 
themselves a follower of Socrates: 
 
… if you’re retentive and a cogitator, if endurance abides in your 
soul, if you don’t tire out either standing or walking, if you’re not 
too annoyed by the cold or too keen on having breakfast, if you 
stay away from wine and gymnasiums and all other follies ... 
 (Clouds 412-417) 
Socrates makes a habit of denying himself whatever he does not absolutely need, 
and is thus known for wearing the same cloak year-round, consuming poor quality 
food and drink and his extreme endurance. These characteristics were doubtlessly 
things that the audience would have recognised as typically Socratic. The same 
characteristics, as well as Socrates’ attitude of superiority, are mentioned by 
Ameipsias in the Konnos and Callias in the Captives, of which only fragments 
survive. The following excerpts are found in The lives of eminent philosophers by 
Diogenes Laertius (trans. Hicks 1925): 
 
Socrates … You are a robust fellow. Where can we get you a 
proper cloak? 
Your sorry plight is an insult to the cobblers. 
And yet, hungry as he is, this man has never stooped to flatter. 
 (Konnos; Lives 2.27-28) 
 
A: Pray why so solemn, why this lofty air? 
B: I’ve every right; I’m helped by Socrates. 
 (Captives; Lives 2.18) 
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  See also Frisk 1960:266 and LSJ, both of which make the connection. 
11
  On this point see also Petrie 1911:519. 
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The obvious criticism against my use of these sources is that they are 
comedies, written for humorous effect, and thus not an accurate reflection of the 
reality. However, it must be noted that a parody cannot work if there is no 
recognition of the person being parodied in it. Hegel argued this point, stating that 
the Clouds therefore must be an exaggerated account of the historical Socrates 
(Most 2007:13). Even so, there is also mention of Socrates’ swagger and his 
austerity in the more traditional sources. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates mentions the 
latter himself: 
 
… I [n]ever exacted or asked pay of anyone. For I think I have a 
sufficient witness that I speak the truth, namely, my poverty. 
 (Apology 31c; trans. Fowler 1960) 
 
It’s also mentioned by Phaedrus in Plato’s Phaedrus: 
 
Phaedrus: I am fortunate, it seems, in being barefoot, you are so 
always  
 (229a; trans. Lamb 1946). 
Alcibiades quotes Clouds 412-417 in Plato’s Symposium (221b), using 
βρενθυόµενος to describe Socrates’s gait, and Antiphon in Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia says that Socrates lives ‘a life that would drive even a slave to desert 
his master’ (1.6.2-3; trans. Marchant 1968), including consuming poor quality food 
and drink, wearing a single worn cloak year round and not wearing any shoes or a 
tunic (1.6.3). Socrates lived a life of poverty, but we have already seen that he was 
born into a rank which allowed him to fight as a hoplite in the war, and thus he 
could not have been as poor as he is so often described to have been. His 
appearance of poverty must then have been by choice. 
Socrates’ attitude of superiority is again mentioned in Plato’s Symposium 
(220b), when Alcibiades says of his shoelessness and single cloak: 
 
The soldiers looked askance at him, thinking that he despised 
them. 
 
and in Xenophon’s Symposium, when Callias asks him what he is proud of: 
 
Socrates drew up his face into a very solemn expression and 
answered, ‘The trade of a procurer’ (3.10). 
In this passage the verb ἀνασπάσας (ἀνασπάω), meaning ‘to draw up’, gives the 
impression of an important air, and σεµνῶς, translated here as ‘solemn’, can also 
be translated negatively as ‘haughty’ or ‘pompous’ (cf. σεµνοπροσωπεῖς at Clouds 
363; LSJ). Alcibiades also mentions Socrates casting a calm, slow glance at 
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enemies and friends alike (ἠρέµα παρασκοπῶν καὶ τοὺς φιλίους καὶ τοὺς 
πολεµίους; Symp. 221b), which has been interpreted as conveying an attitude of 
ridicule and depreciation (Edmunds 2004:195). The attitude of superiority that 
Socrates affects is clear, but it is not immediately clear why this attitude along with 
his Spartan dress may be interpreted as ironic. This physical manifestation of irony 
is elusive and, as Quintilian said, aims to remain concealed. In order to fully 
understand it we must take the function of Socratic irony in its verbal form and the 
historical circumstance within which it developed into account. 
The function of Socratic irony 
The main components of Socrates’ verbal irony are self-deprecation (as in the case 
of Euthyphro and Callicles) and knowledge disavowal (Apol. 21d). In many cases 
his self-deprecation is in itself a form of knowledge disavowal, but we have seen 
that Socrates did at times admit to having some form of knowledge. We thus have 
to ask why he claims he has none. The current prevalent notion of the function of 
Socratic irony is that it is didactic (Lane 2011:243). This in itself is not enough, 
however. We must ask what Socrates means to teach12 and how irony is meant to 
help him do so. As for the former, Socrates means to discover the content of virtue. 
His method is to engage any person willing to converse with him on this matter, 
and irony can be a way of keeping an interlocutor in the conversation. It works in 
two ways. In the first Socrates is ironic and means to be perceived as such, as in 
the case of Callicles in the Gorgias. The interlocutor is wounded by Socrates’ irony 
and wants to prove his point, thus continuing the conversation (Lane 2011:252).  
In the second case Socrates means for his irony to remain concealed, meaning he is 
belittling himself and ironically praising his opponent, which gives the opponent 
confidence to engage in the conversation (Lane 2011:252). 
Socrates thus both gives off an air of superiority when he puts his opponents 
down, asserting that he is leading the argument, and reinforces the possibility of 
superiority of his opponents, thereby encouraging them to engage in elenchic 
discussion and further assert their domination of the argument. Socrates decides 
which of the two tactics is appropriate for each new interlocutor. Continuing the 
conversation gives both Socrates and his opponents a better chance at discovering 
the nature of virtue. 
The pedagogic function may also be present in non-verbal aspects of 
Socratic irony, such as an attitude of superiority and Spartan dress. Within the 
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  ‘Teach’ may not be the most apt word in this case, because when Socrates teaches, he 
himself is also a student. We cannot take his avowals of knowledge as indicative of 
certain knowledge, and thus both he himself and his interlocutor must ‘discover’ through 
elenchic enquiry. 
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historical background discussed earlier Socrates’ critical pro-democratic stance and 
association with known oligarchs becomes problematic.  Why would he associate 
with men so obviously against his philosophical goal, men who do not seek the 
nature of virtue as Socrates does? Furthermore, these known oligarchs, the 
aristocrats of Athens, adopted a distinctively Spartan style in the 5th century BC. 
They imitated many things that the Spartans were known to do as an outward 
expression of their oligarchic sympathies. This included wearing the short cloak 
that Socrates was so often ridiculed for (De Brohun 2001:19). Why would he go so 
far as to dress like them? 
It may be argued that aspects that have here been identified as figural irony, 
in particular Socrates’ austerity, are merely manifestations of ἐγκράτεια (‘self-
mastery’ or ‘self-control’) and not ironic at all, but this answer remains 
unsatisfactory. It does not do to explain Socrates’ attitude of superiority, nor does it 
explain why his particular brand of ἐγκράτεια seemed to his fellow Athenians so 
intensely Spartan.13 For this there seems to be only two reasonable answers: either 
Socrates is a Laconophile and oligarchic sympathiser, or he is being ironic. Since it 
cannot be — has not yet been — convincingly argued that the former is the case, 
perhaps the latter merits some investigation. 
If we concede to Irwin that Socrates may have been intensely critical of the 
Athenian democracy while still preferring it over other existing forms of 
government, and if we accept the argument that Socrates is not a Laconophile, the 
following problem presents itself: Socrates stands very near the beginning of a long 
line of philosophers who practised ἐγκράτεια as a way of life. Dismissing Socrates’ 
austere dress and poverty as merely reflecting ironic commentary on his 
environment delegitimizes an entire tradition, built on fairly solid philosophical 
reasoning. However, if we accept Socrates’ austerity as ἐγκράτεια, we are left with 
the nagging question of why his single threadbare cloak would be specifically 
Spartan, especially if he loved Athens as much as he is said to have done.14  
It would seem to be something he would have had to go out of his way to find, and 
why go to all that trouble? Taking into account the fact that Socrates was well-
known to have been friends with known oligarchs, including at least one of the 
Thirty Tyrants, perhaps it’s not so ridiculous to say that Socrates dressed to be part 
of the group. 
                                                     
13
  Socrates’ short cloak is twice in Plato described as a τρίβων (Symp. 219b; Prot. 335d), 
which is specifically brought into connection with Spartan dress, cf. Demosth. 54.34: 
λακωνίζειν καὶ τρίβωνας ἔχειν (trans. De Witt 1949); LSJ. 
14
  Cf. Vlastos 1983:498, who argues that the Socrates of the Crito loved Athens so much 
that he refused to leave the city even if only for a day, and therefore clearly preferred its 
laws over those of Sparta. 
12 WARREN 
 
According to Rorty ironists strive to criticise vocabularies that are 
considered final,15 because they constantly doubt the validity of their own final 
vocabularies (1989:73). The only way for the ironist to criticise final vocabularies 
is with another vocabulary of its kind, thus a culture can only be criticised with / by 
another culture, a person by another person, etc. (Rorty 1989:80). What this means 
is that the ironist has to constantly extend his own vocabulary by submerging 
himself in another vocabulary in order to criticise at all, and this is more than just a 
verbal phenomenon. It is a physical way of being. 
It is therefore possible that Socrates’ physical manifestation of irony was 
aimed at his anti-democratic associates. Dressing like the aristocrats he interacted 
with on a regular basis would have allowed him access to their circle and the 
chance to converse with them, he would have been submerging himself in their 
vocabulary while simultaneously questioning the validity of his own vocabulary. 
Many of his interlocutors in Plato are pro-Spartan, and yet he did not agree with 
them as one would expect him to do if he really was one of them. Instead he argued 
fervently against them. By dressing like a Spartan Socrates would have gained 
access to the ranks of the educated elite. As an insider and a friend, Socrates would 
have been able to use that access to openly criticise them. 
That is not to say that Socrates did not practice ἐγκράτεια. In fact the two do 
not at all seem mutually exclusive, but rather Socratic irony seems to become an 
extension of the former in service of Socrates’ philosophical goals. In the same 
way his swagger too may have been an ironic appropriation of the Laconic attitude 
he saw in his associates, and in fact an exaggeration thereof. During the reign of 
the Thirty they transformed Athens so that they were the city’s elite while all other 
citizens belonged to the lower classes. These aristocrats thus also thought they 
were superior, and Socrates was known for the same attitude. I would argue, 
however, that Socrates was ironically participating in the activities of his associates 
in order to criticise their political views. Whether he intended for his associates to 
see clearly that he was mocking them in order to incite them to deeper 
philosophical inquiry and ultimately a deeper realisation of knowledge 
(specifically of virtue) to help them make better decisions, both politically and 
morally, is unclear. However, for Socrates to continue the search for virtue, 
particularly in discussion with various interlocutors (many of whom are pro-
Spartan), it would make sense to use irony didactically. 
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  A ‘final vocabulary’ is that vocabulary which is available to a person or a culture in 
order to justify their actions, beliefs and lives. Rorty argues that ‘it is ‘final’ in the sense 
that if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no noncircular 
argumentative recourse’ (1989:73).  
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This brings to light another irony: Socrates’ insistence that he does not take 
part in politics. His criticism of the Athenian democracy should already stand as an 
example of political involvement at some level, as should his involvement in the 
trial of the Arginusae generals, during which he refused to sentence them to death 
because it was illegal (Apol. 32b). His philosophical mission here necessitated his 
taking action. In Gorgias he declared himself the only true statesman: 
 
I think I am one of few, not to say the only one, in Athens who 
attempts the true art of statesmanship, and the only man of the 
present time who manages affairs of state …  
 (Gorgias 521d)  
Notably also, at Gorgias 473e Socrates says to Polus: ‘I am not one of your 
statesmen (τῶν πολιτικῶν)’.16 What does Socrates mean when he says this and then 
contradicts himself a few pages later? It is possible that he means he is not a 
statesman like the other corrupt statesmen in Athens at the time. Callicles, for 
example, will say whatever (the) Demos wants to hear. Instead, Socrates is what a 
politician should be: critical, constantly seeking the nature of virtue, law-abiding 
and willing to learn from others. 
Can Socrates therefore literally mean that he does not take part in politics?  
I do not believe so. It is more likely that what Socrates means is that there should 
be no need to take part in the kind of politics prevalent in Athens in the 5th century 
BC in the first place. An ironic attitude, which by its very nature confines some of 
its onlookers to being ‘outsiders’ (i.e. those who don’t ‘get’ the irony; cf. Muecke 
1969:34), would have offered Socrates a way to display publically his disapproval 
of the state of Athenian politics in the 5th century without offending the ruling 
class. 
Taking into account what has been said about the nature and function of 
Socratic irony, it becomes clear that a redefinition of Socratic irony which allows 
for its many complexities is necessary. The following aspects need to be taken into 
account:  
 
1) Socratic irony is a deliberate act of pretence through which an ironist 
attempts to gain access to a political / social group;  
2) it is a philosophical and political mode of being;  
3) it typically finds its expression in self-deprecation, disavowals of 
knowledge and a physical attitude of austerity and superiority;  
                                                     
16
  My emphasis. 
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4) its purpose is to lead its targets to a deeper independent search for 
knowledge and to criticise the status quo, particularly in a political 
sense.  
There may be further aspects to Socratic irony, to which end further study is 
needed. In particular it is also suggested that the possibility of the success of 
Socratic irony as a pedagogic and political tool needs to be examined. 
Kierkegaard said that Socrates had only irony as ‘infinite, absolute 
negativity’ (1966:287) to offer, and nothing more, but Hegel, who originally held 
the same view and from whom Kierkegaard borrowed the phrase, came to see 
something more, and near the end of his life argued that Socrates did have some 
positive knowledge to impart (Most 2007:14). Were Socrates successful, his 
associates would have realised that they were the targets of Socratic irony. This 
would have lead them to reflect on what had brought them to that point. But, as 
Nietzsche observed, Socrates was not taken seriously in Athens and thus failed in 
his political mission (Conway 1980:260-262). Is failure a necessary outcome of 
Socratic irony? That still remains an open question. 
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